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ABSTRACT 
Rwanda. Kosovo, East Timor, Sudan - the list of places where humanitarian 
crises broke out in the last decades is long. The pictures of genocide, mass starvation, 
murder, rape and other forms of human suffering accompanying those crises have 
become firmly fixed in our memories. The difficult question that inevitable arose was 
if and how the international community should react to such internal state conflicts. 
Heated debates were fought under the catchword 'humanitarian intervention'. 
leading to the unfortunate result that the international community sometimes reacted 
too late, as in Rwanda. and sometimes with questionable authorization, as in Kosovo. 
To solve the dilemma. the Canadian government set up the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The ICISS developed a 
new legal framework - the 'Responsibility to Protect' - which is at the centre of this 
paper. By applying the novel concept to past humanitarian crisis the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Responsibility to Protect are identified. The paper concludes that 
despite its shortcomings, the ICISS's framework is an outstanding contribution in the 
field of international human rights politics. Its success, however, largely depends on 
a change in political attitude. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding footnotes, abstract. table of contents and 
bibliography) comprises 13.781 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In the post-September J 1 world. the 'war on terror' and the threat against 
which it is directed dominate the international public policy agenda. The debates of 
the 1990's, however, have been concerned with different global security issues. Not 
the combat of Al Qaeda, the danger of weapons of mass destruction and homeland 
security have been the urgent problems of the last decade, but the question if and 
how the international community should react to internal state conflicts, 
characterized by murder, rape, mass starvation and other human suffering. Under the 
catchword 'right to humanitarian intervention', national governments. international 
organizations and legal scholars have controversially discussed whether it can ever 
be legitimate for the outside world to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign 
country for the purpose of protecting people at risk, in particular if it is appropriate to 
take coercive military action, under what conditions intervention should be 
exercised, and under whose authority. 1 
The cases around which the debate centred - both where intervention 
happened and where it has failed to happen - have become firmly fixed in our 
memory. 2 While Rwanda in 1994 stands for the shameful and devastating neglect of 
the international community in the face of genocide, the NATO-intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999 "highlights the deficiencies of international legal mechanisms and 
raises the question of the right of states to intervene for humanitarian purposes 
without the authorization of the UN Security Council"3. The inconsistent response to 
humanitarian dilemmas, such as intervention in East Timor in 1999 but inaction in 
other desperate places like Chechnya, clearly shows that the international community 
does not treat all instances of humanitarian crisis similarly. The selectivity with 
which states intervene in some cases of brutal violation of human rights, but stand by 
and watch in others, reveals that humanitarian considerations are not the only factors 
taken into account when deciding whether or not to take up arms. The different 
conditions under which intervention takes place also prove that interventions for 
1 Speech Gareth Evans "The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention .. to the 
American Society of International Law. 98th Annual Meeting. Panel on '·Rethinking Collective 
Action··. Washington DC. I April 2004. International Crisis Group <http://www.icg.org> (last 
accessed 22 December 2004 ). 
~ Evans. above n I. 
' Penelope C Simons .. Humanitarian Intervention: A Review of Literature ... Project Ploughshares 
<http://www.ploughshares.ca> (last accessed 22 December 2004). 
humanitarian purposes are decided on a case-by-case basis and that "the rules of the 
game" are still unclear." The international community lacks a consensus on 
humanitarian intervention. 
Deeply concerned by this situation. United Nations (UN) Secretary General 
Kofi Annan in 1999. and again in 2000. made compelling pleas to the international 
community to find, once and for all, universal rules on how to approach the issue of 
humanitarian interventions, to "forge unity" around the basic questions and process 
involved.5 He stated: 
The genocide in Rwanda showed us how terrible the consequences of inaction can be in the 
face of mass murder. But this year·s conflict in Kosovo raised equally important questions 
about the consequences of action without international consensus and clear legal authority. 
[ ... ] To avoid repeating such tragedies in the next century. I believe it is essential that the 
international community reach consensus - not only on the principle that massive and 
systematic violations of human rights must be checked, wherever they take place. but also on 
ways of deciding what action is necessary. and when. and by whom. 6 
If humanitarian intervention is, indeed. an unacceptable assault on sovereignty. how should 
we respond to a Rwanda. to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violations of human rights 
that affect every percept of our common humanity")7 
It was this appeal of the Secretary General that prompted the Government of 
Canada to set up the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) in September 2000.8 The challenging task of the ICISS was to compose a 
comprehensive report on the issues raised by Kofi Annan and to come up with a new 
4 
e.g. in East Timor intervention only came with the assent of the host power Indonesia whi le in 
Kosovo intervention was undertaken without the consent of the host government Serbia. 
5 The Respo11sibiliry to protect - Repor1 of the !11remario11al Commission 011 !11rerve11rio11 and Stare 
S01 ·ereig11ry (IC/SS) (International Development Research Centre. Ottawa/Canada.2001) VII, 
hereafter cited as "Report. para .. . 
6 
.. Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Connie!'·. UNSC Report 957 (8 September 1999). 
7 
Millennium Report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly .. We the Peoples: The Role of 
the United Nations in the 21" Century ... UNGA Report 54 (2000). 
8 Not only Canada set up a commission on the subject of Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo. The 
governments of Denmark and the Netherlands commissioned tudies (Humanitarian /11ren•e11rio11: 
Legal and Political Aspects. Danish lnstitute of International Affairs. Copenhagen/Denmark. 1999: 
Hu111a11iraria11 !111en·e111io11, Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law and Advisory 
Council on International Affairs. The Hague/NL, 2000). There has also been published a report of an 
independent commission (The Repor1 of 1he !11depe11de111 !111emario11al Commission 011 Koso1•0. 
Oxford University Press. Oxford/UK. 2000) . This research paper. however. only looks at the ICISS-
Report. 
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plan on how to reconcile state sovereignty with the need to respond to severe 
violations of human rights and thereby to resolve the long-standing dilemma of 
humanitarian intervention. Entitled "The Responsibility to Protect", the result of the 
Commission's work was published in December 2001 .9 The report of the ICISS will 
be the centre of this research paper. 
Part II of this paper gives an overview of the problematic nature of 
humanitarian interventions and the major legal, moraL political and practical 
concerns it raises. Part III then presents the ideas of the ICISS as a new conceptual 
framework for humanitarian interventions. This is followed with an application of 
the ICISS' principles to past crisis in part IV of the paper in order to assess the 
capability of the concept to solve some of the long standing dilemmas that have 
surrounded the humanitarian intervention debate in the past. The analysis focuse on 
three specific cases, Rwanda in 1994, Kosovo in 1999, and Iraq in 2003. Part V 
presents a critical in-depth analysis of the Commission's work outlining the strengths 
and weaknesses of the ICISS concept that have not been identified in Part IV. 
Chapter VI describes the reactions of the UN and states to the ' responsibility to 
protect' - idea and explores the question whether it is likely that the international 
community will agree on the ICISS guidelines. It further examines the impact of 
September 11 and the 'war on terror' on the future of humanitarian interventions in 
genera] and the ICISS concept in particular. The paper concludes that despite its 
shortcomings 'The Responsibility to Protect" is an outstanding contribution in the 
field of international human rights politics. The success of the ICISS framework, 
however, depends on a change in political attitude. 
II THE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DEBATE 
Pictures and news of the misery of persecuted ethnic groups, streams of 
refugees, and genocide, again and again evoke the caJJ for intervention. When parts 
of a population are at the mercy of a despot or a hostile group, it goes against the 
grain of democratic states that do not want to risk being complicit by turning a blind 
9 The ICISS not only published the report . but also a supplementary volume containing background 
information. research essays and a comprehensive bibliography of the topic: The Responsibility to 
protect - Resea rch. Bibliography. Backgro1111d - Suppleme111arr Vo/11111e to the Report of the 
/11ternatio11a/ Co111111issio11 011 /11t erl'e11tio11 and State S01 ·ereig11ty (International Development Research 
Centre. Ottawa/Canada. 200 I) hereafter cited as Supplementary Volume. p. 
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eye to the human suffering. Thus, the international community has responded to at 
least some of the humanitarian crises of the last decade with military intervention in 
sovereign states 10 each accompanied and followed by heated debate. These debates 
reached a climax in 1999, when NATO made the unprecedented move of engaging in 
a 78-day air war in Kosovo against the government of Yugoslavia on account of the 
atrocities perpetrated against Kosovo-Albanians without a UN Security Council (SC) 
resolution authorizing the use of force. 11 
At the heart of the controversy over humanitarian interventions lies the 
tension between the principle of state sovereignty, a defining pillar of the UN system 
and international law 12, and the desire to ensure respect for fundamental human 
rights. It is against this background that humanitarian interventions evoke a range of 
passionate and often contradictory views, both with regard to legal, moral, political 
and practical issues. After defining the term 'humanitarian intervention ' for the 
purpose of this research paper, this part of the essay seeks to give an overview of the 
different positions on these matters. 
A Defining 'Humanitarian Intervention' 
For the purpose of the subsequent discussion 'humanitarian intervention' is 
the use of military force, across state borders, to prevent or alleviate egregious and 
widespread human rights abuses, without the consent - and against the wishes - of 
the state in which human rights abuses are taking place. 13 
In defining the term in this way, the discussion is explicitly limited to military 
interventions as the most intrusive and therefore the most controversial form of 
humanitarian intervention. 14 
10 
The 1991-intervention in Northern Iraq by Allied Forces, and the interventions in Somalia in 1992, 
Rwanda in 1994 and Sierra Leone in I 997. were all justified on humanitarian grounds. 
11 
Kwek Ju-Hon ·'Sovereign Rights and International Obligations: The Future of Humanitarian 
Intervention after Kosovo" (200 I) 27(2) Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces. The Mission of the 
Singapore Armed Forces <http://www.mindef.gov.sg> (last accessed 22 December 2004). 
12 
Jennifer N Welsh .. From right to responsibility: Humanitarian Intervention and international 
society .. (2002) 8(4) Global Governance 503. 503. 
13 Edward Newman '·Humanitarian Intervention , Legality and Legitimacy .. (2002) 6(4) The 
International Journal of Human Rights I 02, I 03. 
14 Ju-Hon, above n 11. 
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B The Legal Debate 
The law on the use of force is one of the most controversial areas of 
international law. 15 The UN-Charter and it seemingly conflicting provisions are the 
starting point for any legal discussion of humanitarian intervention. 
Article 2(4) of the Charter constitutes the basic prohibition on the use of force 
by states. 16 It provides that: 
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force agai nst the territori al integrity or political independence of any state. or in any 
other manner inconsisten t with the Purposes of the United ations. 
Article 2(7) further strengthens the principle of state sovereignty
17 by stating 
that the UN is not legally permitted to interfere in affairs "which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state". 
Articles 39 and 42 are concerned with threats to international peace. They 
give the UNSC the power to determine the existence of any such threat and to 
"decide which measures shall be taken [ ... ] to maintain or restore international peace 
and security". This includes the ability to authorize an armed intervention. 
Based on these Articles of the UN-Charter, the legality of humanitarian 
intervention, with or without U SC sanction, is highly disputed. 18 
The anti-interventionists contend that Article 2(4) unambiguously prohibits 
the u e of force by member states except in self-defence 19. An intervention by the 
UN itself is, with certain exceptions, said to be precluded by Article 2(7). It is 
claimed that no article of the Charter specificalJy mentions or even provides an 
exception for humanitarian intervention and that in fact, international legal 
1
=- Christine Gray 'The Use of Force and the International Legal Order" in Malcolm D Evans (eel) 
lntemarional Lall' (5ed. Oxford University Press. Oxford/UK. 2003) 589. 589. 
16 Gray. above n 15. 591. 
17 David Yesel "The Lonely Pragmati st: Humanitarian Intervention in an Imperfect World" (2003) 18 
BYO J. Pub. L. I. 9. 
18 Yesel, above n 17. 10. 
19 see United Nations Charter. article 51. 
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instruments subsequent to the Charter have reinforced the strict principle of non-
intervention.20 The l 970 General Assembly Declaration of Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter21 proclaimed '·the duty not to intervene in matters 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in accordance with the Charter." 
Furthermore. the judgement of the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v 
Unired Srates22 is relied on, in which the Court stated that "the principle of non-
intervention involves the right of every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without 
outside interference". The anti-interventionists thus conclude that international law 
does not provide a vehicle for either UN authorized, or unauthorized humanitarian 
interventions, as the sovereignty of the state must be respected to the utmost. 2:1 
Those who support humanitarian intervention submit that Article 2(7) of the 
Charter has '·never been interpreted by the General Assembly and the Security 
Council as preventing action by the UN in serious cases of human rights violation"24 . 
To legitimate UN interventions. they choose an expansive interpretation of Articles 
39 and 42 U Charter?' By giving the SC jurisdiction over any "threat to the peace", 
rather than over any threat to international peace, the provisions would permit 
intervention to end human rights violations no matter if the conflict is inter- or intra-
state.26 Thus, UN-sanctioned humanitarian interventions are said to be lawful 
exceptions to the Charter's general prohibition of forcible self-help in international 
relations. 27 Others argue that humanitarian interventions constitute an acceptable 
form of interference within the scope of Article 2(7), as the violation of rights 
protected by the UN-Charter does not fall "within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
20 
T Modibo Ocran ·The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust Peacekeeping" 
(2002) 25 B.C. Int'J & Comp. L. Rev. I. 15. 
21 
UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) (24 October I 970). 
22 
Military and Paramilita,y AcTil'iTies in and againsl Nicaragua (Nicaragua 1• Uni1ed Sw1es of 
America) I I 986] ICJ Rep I 4. I 06. 
23 
Jennifer L Cternecki ·The United Nations' Paradox: The Battle between Humanitarian Intervention 
and State Sovereignty .. (2003) 4 I Duq. L. Rev. 39 I , 396. 
2
~ Ocran. above n 20. I 9 cite the statement of Ross ides. the represcntati ve of Cyprus in the 
discussions of the 6th Committee of the UN General Assembly in I 963 who said: .. Article 2 
paragraph 7 of the Charter has repeatedly been interpreted by the General Assembly as allowing the 
United Nations to intervene in the internal affairs of a state in case of a nagrant violation of human 
rights or the prohibitions of the Charter.·· (N[6]/[SR806]). 
25 
J L Holzgrefe ·The humanitarian intervention debate .. in J L Holzgrefe and Robert O Keohane (eds) 
Humanilarian lmen·e111ion - Ethical, legal, and poli1ical dilemmas (Cambridge University Press. 
Cambridge/UK. 2003) 15. 40 and 4 I. 
26 Holzgrcfe, above n 25, 40 and 4 I . 
27 Holtgrefe. above n 25. 43. 
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state". 28 The contention that the UNSC is empowered to authorize humanitarian 
interventions is supported by the practice of the Council itself, which used its right 
under Articles 39 and 42 to sanction the UN interventions in Somalia, Rwanda, and 
Haiti. 29 
The interventionists further argue that Article 2( 4) does not contain a general 
and comprehensive prohibition on the use of force by member states, but that it 
merely regulates conditions under which force is prohibited.30 As humanitarian 
interventions, in principle, are neither directed against "territorial integrity nor 
political independence'' of a state, Article 2(4) does not forbid them.3 1 This reasoning 
is rejected by many international lawyers32 , firstly on the ground that with the 
wording of Article 2( 4) the drafters of the Charter clearly intended to reinforce, 
rather than restrict the ban on the use of force in international relations33 and 
secondly on the ground that an armed intervention necessarily interferes in domestic 
politics.3-1 To reconcile humanitarian intervention with the UN-Charter 
interventionists also argue that such interventions would not be "inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations", but would instead promote them. as the protection 
of human rights is one of the primary goals3.'i of the UN. 36 Thus, it is argued that 
Article 2(4) permits unauthorized humanitarian intervention by member states where 
28 See for example Felix Ermacora ·'Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction .. ( 1968) 124 Recueil des 
Cours 375. 436 who states that ··the right to self-determination and the protection of human rights in 
matters of discrimination as far as ·gross violations· or ·consistent patterns of violations· are 
concerned are no longer essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states ... : sec also W Michael 
Reisman and Myres S MacDougal .. Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the lbos·· in Richard B 
Lillich (ed) Humanitarian lnten ·enrion (Ind the United Nations (University of Virginia Press. 
Charlottesville/USA. 1973) 189. 
29 HolZQrefe. above n 25. 41. 
30 Ju-H~n, above n 11. 
31 Reisman and MacDougal , above n 28. 171. 
32 Ian Brownlie for example writes in International lmr mzd the Use of Force by Swtes (Clarendon 
Press. Oxford/UK. 1963) 267: .. If it is asserted that the phrase may have a qualifying effect then the 
writers making this assertion face the difficulty that it involves an admission that there is an 
ambiguity, and in such a case recourse may be had to the 1ml'(l11X preparatoires. which reveal a 
meaning contrary to that asserted .... 
33 Holzgrcfc. above n 25, 38. 
3
-1 Oscar Schachter .. The Legality of Pro-Democratic lnvasion .. ( 1984) 78 A.J .I.L. 645. 649; Yesel , 
above n 17. I I. 
35 Article 1(3) of the UN Charter states: .. The Purposes of the United Nations arc [ ... J to achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic. social. cultural. or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rig/us and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race. sex. language, or religion ... 
36 Fernando R Tes6n Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into lmr and Morality (Transnational 
Publishers Inc .. Irvington-on-Hudson/Ncw York/USA. 1997) 151. 
7 
the SC fails to meet one of its key tasks - the protection of human rights.
37 This 
assertion is countered by others who state that the drafting history of the Charter 
proves that the reference to the purposes of the UN in Article 4(2) was "meant to 
supplement. rather than qualify. the prohibition on the unauthorized use of armed 
'8 19 force"·' and was added to guarantee that there would be no loopholes. · 
One pro-interventionist response to the alleged illegality of unauthorized or 
so-called unilateral humanitarian interventions under the UN-Charter is that a 
customary international law40 supporting a right to intervene on humanitarian 
. h h d . . 41 s h 1 4') h grounds e1t er as emerge or 1s emergrng. ome sc o ars - argue t at state 
practice in the 19th and early 20th 43 century established a customary right of 
unauthorized humanitarian intervention which continues to exist until now.
44 It has 
been put forward that, even if one acknowledges that such right ever existed, it did 
not legally survive the creation of the UN and the passing of the UN Charter.45 
However. it is said, that this does not rule out the possibility that a customary right of 
unauthorized intervention is emerging or could develop in the future. 46 The increased 
occurrence of unilateral interventions with stated humanitarian goals, for example in 
Kosovo. supports the view that unauthorized interventions may in time become 
law.47 
37 W Michael Reisman .. Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law .. (1985) 10 Y.J. 
lnt'l L. 279. 279 and 280. 
38 Holzgrefe. above n 25. 40. 
39 Brownlie. above n 32. 268: see also Hans Wehberg '·L'lnterdiction du Recours a la Force .. ( 1951) 
78 Recueil des Cours 7, 70. 
40 
A customary international law requires firstly state practice. and secondly .. opinion juris ... i.e . a 
sense of legal obligation under which a state acts; sec Vcsel. above n 17. 13 and 14. 
41 Vesel. above n 17. 13 . 
41 Richard B Lillich .. Forcible Self-help by States to Protect Human Rights'' ( 1967) 53 Iowa L. Rev. 
325. 334; Jean-Pierre L Fonteyne .. The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian 
Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter·· ( 1974) Cali f. West. Int'I L. J. 203 et seqq. 
43 e.g. Britain. France. and Russia in Greece 1827-1830/ France in Syria 1860-1861/ United States in 
Cuba 1898. 
44 Holzgrefe. above n 25. 44 and 45. 
4
' Holzgrefe. above n 25, 45. 
46 See for example Antonio Cassese "Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are we moving towards International 
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?" ( 1999) I O EJIL 
23. 29. 
47 Vesel. above n 17. 14. 
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C The Moral Debate 
The debate about the legality of humanitarian intervention continues. The 
situations, in which interventions are considered however, clearly show that a solely 
legal approach falls far short of the issue. A legal action is not necessarily legitimate 
and an illegal action may well be justified on moral grounds. Thus, the controversy 
about humanitarian interventions inevitably involves moral and ethical questions. 
The moral argument for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is 
compelling.48 People in misery deserve help, no matter which countries' nationals 
they are. As one writer puts it: "[t]he right of people not to be killed should not 
depend on whether the state of which they are citizens is in a position to protect 
them, wants to protect them, or is itself the source of the danger"49. 
The desire to help those in need, however, faces an ethical dilemma. Ending 
human suffering can only be achieved with military force. thus with means that 
inevitably bring about harm and devastation themselves. Use of force nece sarily 
involves taking life, both as the direct result of combat. and as the indirect result of 
the destruction of roads, shelter, water supplies, and other basic necessities.50 Thus, 
critics of humanitarian intervention raise valid questions over the morality of force to 
'·prevent" loss of life. 51 They further challenge the proportionality of the deployment 
of certain weapons for humanitarian purposes. Even if there is an imperative to 
intervene, can a high level bombing campaign like occurred in Kosovo amount to 
humanitarian action?5~ 
The moral debate also revolves around the perceived irreconcilability 
between the notion of intervention and state sovereignty. One of the defining features 
of the modern international system is the idea that each state is sovereign and free to 
48 John J Merriam ·'Kosovo and the law or humanitarian intervention·· (2001) :n Case W. Res. J. Int · 1 
L. 111, 115. 
49 Malvina Halberstam "The Legality or Humanitarian Intervention"' ( 1995) 3( I) Cardozo J. Int"l & 
Comp. L. I. 2. 
50 Merriam. above n 48. 115. 
5 1 Merriam. above n 48. 115. 
51 Gray. above n 15. 597. 
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act as it desires within its own borders. 53 Consequently, some scholars put forward 
the idea that a state has no right to interfere in the domestic sphere of politics of 
another state5-l and thus can never be allowed to affect another state's autonomy and 
self-determination by intervening for moral (or humanitarian) reasons. The state is 
the only sphere of morality. 55 In the words of Walzer: "[t]hough states are founded 
for the sake of life and liberty, they cannot be challenged in the name of life and 
Jiberty."56 Least of all have states and their citizens an obligation to the citizens of 
other states to intervene. "Men and Women are protected and their interests 
represented only by their own government."57 
Others reject these arguments. Sovereignty is said to be conditional. 58 "It is 
linked to internal legitimacy and requires governments to respect at least minimally 
the well-being and human rights of their citizens."59 According to Smith60 "it follows 
then, that a state that is oppressive and violates the autonomy and integrity of its 
subjects forfeits its moral claim to full sovereignty". Fernando R Teson takes a 
. ·1 . d 61 s1m1 ar view an argues: 
thai because the ultimate justification of the existence of states is the protection and 
enforcement of the natural rights of the citizens, a government that engages in substantial 
violations of human rights betrays the very purpose for which it exists and so forfeits not only 
its domestic legitimacy. but its international legitimacy as well. 
In challenging the view that moral obligations end at the states border, natural 
law theorists62 introduce the idea of a global morality. They argue that human beings 
5
' Francis Kofi Abiew The E, ·olution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian lnten•ention 
(Kluwer Law International. The Hague/NL, London/UK. Boston /USA. 1999) 23. 
,-1 Tes6n. above n 36. 26. 
55 Simons. above n 2. 
,<, Michael Walzer Just and Unjust Wars: A moral Argument ,rith Historical Illustrations (Basic 
Books Publishers. New York/USA. 1977) 61. 
'
7 Walzer. above n 56. 6 I. 
~· Simons. above n 2. 
59 Simons. above n 2. 
60 Michael J Smith ··Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues" in Joel H 
Rosenthal (ed) Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader (Georgetown University Press. Washington 
DC/USA. 1999) 271. 289. 
61 Tes6n. above n 36. 15 and 16. 
62 Terry Nard in .. The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention" (2002) 16( I) Ethics and International 
Affairs 57 et seqq. : Joseph Boyle ··Natural Law and International Ethics .. in Terry Nardin and David 
R Mapel (eds) Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge/UK. New 
York/USA. 1992) 112. 123. 
10 
have certain moral duties by virtue of their common humanity. 63 These moral duties 
are said to be universal. In the words of Joseph Boyle: "Our moral obligations to 
others are not limited to people with whom we are bound in community[ ... ]. We are 
obliged to help whoever we can [ ... ]."64 Thus, there is no justification to deny people 
protection and help just because they live somewhere else. 
D The Political and Practical Debate 
The third strand of the debate about humanitarian intervention leaves behind 
the question if, and under which circumstances, military force is legally/morally 
desirable or acceptable and focuses on the practical and political problems that arise 
in connection with humanitarian interventions. One of these problems relates to the 
decision making process concerned with interventions. States act in their national 
interest and are often only willing to intervene where the action serves that interest. 
This attitude has been painfully displayed in the past, which bore many situations of 
brutal violations of human rights that required intervention, but where intervention 
did not take place.65 The reality is that the decision to intervene or to keep out of the 
conflict usually combines a mix of altruistic humanitarian considerations, self-
serving policy motives, media attention and pressure of the public opinion, rather 
than being a pure reflection of the humanitarian crisis in question. This is particularly 
fatal in view of the present power structure within the UN. A UN intervention can 
only take place when the SC. the main source of authority for interventions, enacts a 
corresponding resolution.66 The permanent five members of the SC - Russia, France, 
China, the USA and the UK - however enjoy veto rights and therefore have the 
possibility to inhibit UN authorized intervention even if the human rights violations 
6
·
1 HolLgrefe, above n 25 . 25. 
6-1 Boyle. above n 62 . 123 
65 On p 296 of his book Hu111011iroria11 !11rerl'e11 rio11 - The Un ired Norions i11 011 el'O!l'i11g 1,·or/d order 
(University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia/USA. 1996) Sean D Murphy enumerates 30 states. 
among these Afghanistan. Sierra Leone and Guatemala. where the internal s ituation demanded 
intervention. but intervention failed to happen. 
66 The UN General Assembly has reso lved in UNGA Resolution 377(V) (3 November 1950) "that if 
the Security Council. because of lack of una nimity of the permanent members. fails to exercise its 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there 
appears to be a threat to the peace. breach of the peace. or act of aggression. the General Assembly 
shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to 
Members for collective measures. including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression 
the use of armed force when necessary. to maintain or restore international peace and security ... 
However. the Assembly's decisions arc not binding and only have the status of "recommendations". 
and the need to interfere are obvious. In other words: international security 1s 
dominated by the will of only five states and if only one of these states is reluctant to 
agree on the use of force, the SC is incapable of action. This structure of the SC has 
the potential to affect the fates of miJJions of people and thus has evoked many 
demands for reform. 
The discussion further centres on the problems that emerge once the decision 
to use military force has been made. A central theme in this context is the need to 
ensure that interventions are carried out effectively. This can only be achieved if the 
necessary financial and military resources are provided. The UN's limited budget 
and the lack of an U army are the most problematic aspects in this context. The 
actual implementation of an intervention depends on the readiness of so-called 
"coalitions of the wiJling" to carry out and also finance the planned operation. The 
unpleasant reality is that such wiJJingness is not always existent and , again, strongly 
hinges upon the degree of self-interest involved. The failure of some missions. and 
especially the cases in which intervention did not take place at all. numerously 
resulted out of the lacking political wiJI of governments to risk the lives of their own 
soldiers. Improved strategies for intervention, not only with regard to planning, but 
also with regard to logistics and coordination, could save lives on both sides, and are 
widely caJJed for and debated. 
III "THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT" 
In the light of the legal, moral, political and practical difficulties raised by 
humanitarian interventions, it becomes obvious that a uniform, globaJJy accepted 
position on the issue is more than desirable. In regard to the numerous internal 
conflicts of the 1990 s and the resulting humanitarian disasters67 , completely 
rejecting the idea of intervention is not an acceptable option. As much as one hopes 
otherwise, it is likely that sooner or later reports wiJJ emerge again from somewhere 
in the world of massacres, mass tarvation , rape and ethnic cleansing.68 This time the 
international community has to offer better answers to these situations than the ad 
67 According to Gareth Evans 'The responsibility to protect: a new approach to humanitarian 
intervention .. (2002) Princeton University <http://www.princeton.edu> (last accessed 28 October 
2004) 53 of the 56 armed conflicts arising between 1990 and 2000 were intra-State. 
68 Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun .. The Responsibility to Protect'· (2002) 81 (6) Foreign Affairs 
99, Global Policy Forum <http://www.globalpolicy.org> (last accessed 28 October 2004 ). 
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hoe, and often ineffective or counter-productive reactions of the past.
69 The 
challenge, thus, is to develop agreed rules for handling cases such as Somalia, 
Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo70 and to lay down a universally accepted legal and 
political framework for the use of force for humanitarian purposes. The Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty responds to this 
challenge and has the ambitious aim to reconcile the different and often opposing 
claims relating to interventions71 by suggesting a new approach to action - 'The 
Responsibility to Protect' .72 
A The Establishment of the ICISS and its Goals 
The story of the ICISS began at the UN Millennium Assembly in September 
2000. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien there announced the establishment of 
an international working group which would be concerned with military 
interventions motivated by humanitarian purposes and whose task would be to 
develop a way to deal with them consistent with current international law?' In 
launching the ICISS, the then Canadian Foreign Minister Lord Axworthy expressed 
his hope that the Commission would promote a comprehensive debate on the issues 
and would foster global political consensus on how to move from polemics, and 
often para! ysis, toward action within the international system. 
74 
The twelve-member international Commission. consisting of weighty and 
respected figures 75 from five continents, and from many intellectual and cultural 
backgrounds, was co-chaired by two highly experienced statesmen. Gareth Evans, 
69 Supplementary volume. VI. 
70 Evans and Sahnoun. above n 68 . 
71 Edward Newman. above n 13. I 05. 
72 Eduardo Posada "The Responsibility to protect". Ideas para la paz <http://www.ideaspaz.org> (last 
accessed 28 October 2004 ). 
n The ICTSS was set up by the Canadian Government. The funding for the Commission· s work 
however was not only provided by Canada but also by the governments of Switzerland and the UK as 
well as by major international foundations. e.g. the Carnegie Corporation of New York. the William 
and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation etc.; sec Supplementary Volume. 344. 
7
.i Supplementary Volume, 341; lt was suggested that the Commission completes its work within a 
year. enabling the Canadian Government to present the ICISS's findings to the UN and its member 
states in the 56th session of the General Assembly. 
7
' Gareth Evans (Australia). Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria). Gisele Cote-Harper (Canada). Lee 
Hamilton (US). Michael Ignatieff (Canada). Vladimir Lukin (Russia). Klaus Naumann (Germany), 
Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa). Fidel V Ramos (Philippines). Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzerland). 
Eduardo Stein Barillas (Guatemala) and Ramesh Thakur (India). 
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former foreign minister of Australia, and Mohamend Sahoun, senior Algerian 
diplomat and former UN special representative in Somalia. 76 
It approached its task with three basic objectives: "first, it should produce 
something intellectually satisfying that would be taken seriously by the policy and 
academic community". 77 Secondly, its recommendations had to be acceptable in 
principle by governments around the world and not easily rejected out of hand. 78 
Finally, the recommendations should not remain theoretical considerations, but 
should present practical guidelines that significantly affect international political 
practise and are "'capable of actually motivating action"79. 
In its efforts to capture as many views as possible, the Commission held 
consultations around the world. 80 The consensus found during these meetings has 
been presented to the public in the Commission's final report "The Responsibility to 
Protect" which main findings and recommendations are summarized below. 
B Summary of the Commission's Findings and Recommendations 
The ICISS report turns the traditional debate about humanitarian interventions 
on its head. Rather than revisiting the 'right to intervene ', it focuses on the 
responsibility of states to protect vulnerable populations at risk from civil wars, 
insurgencies, state repression and state collapse. 81 At the heart of this conceptual 
approach is a shift in thinking about the essence of sovereignty from control to 
responsibility.82 The report acknowledges that: 83 
Sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally - to respect the sovereignty of other 
states. and internally . to respect the dignity and bas ic rights of all the people within the state. 
In international human rights covenants. in UN practice. and in state practice itself, 
76 
Adam Roberts "One Step Forward in the Search for the Impossible" (2003) 7(3) The International 
Journal of Human Rights 142. 143. 
77 
Simon Chesterman~"Rcsponsibility to Protect - cliscu sec! at New York Seminar" (2002) 
International Peace Academy <http://www.ipacaclcmy.org> (last accessed 29 October 2004). 
78 Chesterman. above n 77. 
79 Chesterman. above n 77. 
8° Chesterman. above n 77: the Commission met in Ottawa. Geneva, London. Maputo. Washington 
DC. Santiago. Cairo, Paris. New Delhi. Beijing and St. Petersburg. 
81 Chesterman. above n 77. 
82 Evans and Sahnoun. above n 68. 
83 Report. para 1.35. 
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sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual responsibility. Sovereignty as 
responsibility has become the minimum content of good international citizenship. 
As the respect for human rights is seen as an essential component of a 
sovereign state, for the Commission, it logically follows that a sovereign state has a 
responsibility to protect its own citizens from avoidable catastrophe. If, but only if, it 
fails, the broader community must shoulder that responsibility. 84 The ICISS report 
summarizes these two core principles as follows: 
I. State sovereignty implies responsibility and the primary responsibility for the protection 
of its people lies with the state itself. 
2. Where a population is suffering serious harm. as a result of internal war. 111surgency. 
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert 
it , the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. 
Seen in this way, coercive external engagement inside a state no longer 
appears illegitimate.85 It is not the exercise of a right to intervene, but the fulfilment 
of a subsidiary obligation to help those in need. An intervention therefore does not 
contradict the notion of state sovereignty, but complements it. 
By relying on the 'responsibility to protect' - principle, the ICISS not only 
seeks to rephrase the concept of sovereignty, but also to achieve a shift in the terms 
and the perspectives of the debate. The Commission is of the opinion that the debate 
should get away from the claims of states for a 'right to intervene' and focus on "the 
requirements of those who need or seek assistance". 86 In response to the very strong 
opposition expressed by humanitarian agencies and organizations towards any 
militarization of the word 'humanitarian'. the Commission further suggests a 
terminological change from ' humanitarian intervention' to 'intervention for human 
· , 87 protect10n purposes . 
8
~ Joelle Tanguy .. Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention" (2003) 17( I) Ethics & International 
Affairs 141. 142. 
85 Jenni fer Welsh. Carolin Thiel king and S Neil Macfarlane .. The Responsibility to protect -
Assessing the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty" (2002) 
57( 4) International Journal 487. 491. 
86 R ? 1" eport, para ___ .1. 
87 Report. para 1.39 and I .40. 
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According to the ICISS report, the responsibility to protect has three integral 
and essential components: not only is it the responsibility to react to an actual or 
apprehended human catastrophe, but to prevent it, and the responsibility to rebuild 
after the event. 88 
I The responsibility to prevent 
The Commission emphasizes that in its view "prevention is the single most 
important dimension of the responsibility to protect"89 . Thus, prevention options 
should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated.90 In an 
unmistakable way the Commission directly challenges the international community 
to finally "close the gap between rhetorical support for prevention and tangible 
commitment"91 . 
According to the ICISS, effective prevention "depends on disparate actors 
working together strategically"92 . These institutions must, in accordance with the 
findings of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflic{', address both 
the root causes of internal conflicts ( e.g. poverty and political repression), and the 
more immediate triggers, the so called direct causes of internal conflict94 
2 The responsibility to react 
The most extensive part of the report revolves around the issue of reaction. 
The Commission states that: 
[w]hen preventive measures fail to resolve or contain the situation and when a state is unable 
or unwilling to redress the situation. then interventionary measures by other members of the 
broader community of states may be required. These coercive measures may include 
88 Report, para 2.32. 
89 Report, synopsis XII. 
90 Report, synopsis XII. 
91 Report, para 3. J. 
92 
This includes states, the UN. the international financial institutions, regional organizations, NGO's, 
religious groups. the business community and the media. see report, para 3.36. 
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political, economic or judicial measures, and in extreme ea e - but only extreme cases -
they may also include military action. 95 
In an attempt to define what constitutes an "extreme case'' the ICISS relies on 
the traditional 'just war' framework. The Commission identifies six criteria that have 
to be satisfied to justify military intervention: the 'just cause' threshold, four 
precautionary principles. and the requirement of 'right authority'. 
(a) The 'just cause' threshold 
In the Commission's view, exceptions to the principle of non-intervention 
should be limited to instances in which serious and irreparable harm occurs to human 
beings or is imminently likely to occur. 96 Thus, according to the ICISS, military 
intervention is only justified in two broad sets of circumstances, namely in order to 
halt or avert: 97 
• large scale loss of life. actual or apprehended. with genocidal intent or not. which is the 
product either of deliberate state action. or state neglect or inability to act. or a failed state 
situation: or 
• large scale "ethnic cleansing··. actual or apprehended. whether carried out by killing. forced 
expulsion. acts of terror or rape. 
The ICISS recommends utilizing existing institutions, such as UN organs and 
agencies. other international organizations and GO's, and on occasion the media. to 
determine whether events do in fact meet the 'just cause' - criterion. 98 
(b) Precautionary principles 
The Commission lays down four other conditions that must be met to justify 
intervention. 
The first condition is ·right intention'. The pnmary purpose of the 
intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or 
9-
) Report. para 4.1. 
96 Report. para 4. 18. 
97 Report, para 4.19. 
9 Report. para 4.30. 
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avert human suffering.99 Right intention is better assured with multilateral 
operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned. 100 
The second precautionary principle i 'last resort'. All non-military options 
for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis must be explored before force is 
used. 10 1 This does not neces arily mean that every such option must literally have 
been tried and failed; but it does mean that there must be reasonable grounds for 
believing that lesser measures would not have succeeded. 102 
The Commission further makes clear that military action can only be justified 
if it is carried out with 'proportional means'. The scale. duration and intensity of the 
planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined 
h · b' · 101 uman protect10n o ~ect1ve. · 
Finally, according to the ICISS, the operation must have a 'reasonable chance 
of success', with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the 
f · · 10.t consequences o mact10n. 
(c) Right authority 
The question of who has the right to determine whether a military 
intervention for human protection purposes should be carried out is by far the most 
important issue in the debate about humanitarian interventions. Accordingly, the last 
criterion of the ICISS framework for justified military action is that of 'right 
authority'. The ICISS' general position on this issue is spelled out clearly: "There is 
no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to 
authorize military intervention for human protection purposes." 105 Thus, SC 
authorization should in all cases be sought prior to taking any military action. 106 
99 Report. synopsis XII. 
100 Report. synopsis XII. 
10 1 Report. para 4.:n . 
10° - Report. para 4.37. 
im Report. synopsis XII. 
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While affirming the primacy of the UNSC, the ICISS, however, recommends 
that the 'Permanent Five' members should agree not to apply their veto power in 
matters where their vital state interests are not involved, so that the passage of 
resolutions authorizing intervention for which there is otherwise majority support is 
not obstructed. If the SC reject a proposal for intervention or fails to deal with it in a 
reasonable time, alternative options are needed. The Commission recommends that 
in such a case intervention could be decided either by the General Assembly in an 
Emergency Special Session under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure, or by regional 
organizations under Chapter VIII of the U -Charter, subject to their seeking 
subsequent authorization from the SC. 
When an intervention meets the six criteria described above, the military 
action is legitimate in ICISS' s view. 
3 The responsibility to rebuild 
Finally, the responsibility to protect implies the responsibility to rebuild. This 
means that if military action is taken, the interveners should not run off, leaving 
destruction and instability behind, but should help to "build a durable peace, and to 
promote good governance and sustainable development" 107 . This commitment should 
ideally include full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation of 
hostile groups, and should seek to address the causes of the harm the intervention 
was designed to halt or avert. 108 
4 Operational principles 
The ICISS report also lays down additional ·operational principles' for 
military actions to guide decision makers contemplating interventions. 109 Some of the 
Commission's considerations will be outlined in the analy ·is of the ICISS report in 
chapter V of this paper. 
107 Report. para 5.1. 
108 Evans. above n I. 
109 S Neil Macfarlane, Carolin J Thielking and Thomas G Weiss ·The Responsibility to Protect: is 
anyone interested in humanitarian intervention?"' (2004) 25(5) Third World Quarterly 977. 978. 
IV APPLICATION OF THE ICISS' PRINCIPLES TO PAST CRISES 
One of the ICISS' declared aims was to produce guidelines for military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes that are not only of theoretical value, but first 
and foremost of practical usefulness. If the Commission's framework for 
humanitarian interventions is capable of guiding the international community in the 
future in its difficult task of deciding how to respond to humanitarian disasters can be 
determined best by applying the Commission's principles to past crisis. Only if the 
new framework is able to solve past dilemmas can it be a useful tool for the future. 
The humanitarian catastrophe in Rwanda in 1994 is one of the darkest 
chapters of UN history and global policy post World War II. It laid bare the full 
horror of inaction in the face of genocide. 11° Kosovo, where intervention did take 
place, raised totally different questions , but was not less controversial. The US led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its justification on both moral and humanitarian grounds 
was reminiscent of another long standing dilemma: the vague nature of the doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention, giving powerful states a licence to use force and 
making it subject to abuse. 
The following section applies the ICISS framework to these specific cases 
and asks if the ICISS approach provides adequate answers to the difficulties that 
arose in the context of each of them. 
A Rwanda-1994 
The genocide which took place in the Central African country of Rwanda in 
1994 was one of the most intensive killing campaigns - possibly the most intensive -
in human history.
111 In just one hundred days 800,000 people were killed. Most of 
the dead were members of Rwanda·s minority Tutsi ethnic group; most of those who 
perpetrated the violence were extremist elements of the country's majority Hutus. 
The killings were long planned - the trigger for their implementation however was 
the shooting down of the airplane carrying Rwanda's Hutu president Habyarimana 
11 0 Report. para 1.1. 
111 
"Case-Study: Genocide in Rwanda - 1994·• Gendercidc watch <http://www.gendercide.org> (last 
accessed 2 November 2004). 
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and his Burundian counterpart on 6 April 1994. Both presidents were killed. 11 '.! 
Within an hour of the plane crash, the Presidential Guard, the Rwandan armed forces 
and the lnterahamwe 113 militia set up roadblocks and barricades and began the 
organized slaughter, starting in the capital Kigali. 11 -1 The first targets were the 
decision makers of the country and the intellectuals. Shortly after, the Hutus began 
executing ordinary Tutsi citizens as well as Hutu moderates. Victims were hacked to 
death, burned alive, thrown dead or alive into pits or latrines, forced to murder their 
own friends or relatives. 115 In a nutshell, in only 4 months, over half of Rwanda's 
total population estimated at 8. l million before the genocide. had either been killed. 
annihilated by epidemics, or internally displaced as a result of the civil war. 11 6 
Despite the fact that the UN had received accurate information about the 
planning of the genocide more than three months before the outbreak of the actual 
conflict 117 , and despite the unprecedented magnitude of the humanitarian disaster 
following, the international response to Rwanda was less than enthusiastic. 11 8 The 
UN did not take any measures to prevent the foreseeable catastrophe. Its reaction 
when the disaster finally commenced was similarly weak. On 21 April 1994, in the 
middle of the crisis 11 9, the Security Council passed Resolution 912''.!0, reducing the 
number of the UN peacekeepers stationed in Rwanda from 2,500 to a tiny force of 
only 270 soldiers for the entire country. It thereby "sent an unmistakable message to 
the genocidal forces that there was little or no international resolve to stand in their 
way" I'.! 1• The atrocities continued and it was not until 17 May 1994 that the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 918. which imposed an arms embargo and authorized an 
112 Until today it is not clear who is responsible for the assassination. There arc hints that not the 
Tutsis. as often alleged, but the Hutu military leadership assassinated Habyarimana in order to take 
over power and perpetrate the long planned genocide of the Tutsis. 
113 Interahamwe means ·Those who stand together ... 
11
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genocide .. (lngvar Carlsson. Han Sung-Joo and Rufus M Kupolati . 1999. available online at 
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expansion of the UN troops to 5,500 soldiers to stop the massacres.
122 
However, one 
months later, these troops were still not deployed, the reason being that members 
states made no commitments to provide the requisite number of soldiers for such an 
undertaking. 12:, Given the absence of multilateral action, France finally expressed its 
preparedness to intervene unilaterally in Rwanda. The UN-authorized "Operation 
Turquoise" began on 2'.2 June 1994. Approximately one month later a cease-fire was 
reached, which effectively ended the civil war.
124 The outcome of the humanitarian 
tragedy of Rwanda, however, reveals a painful truth: the response of the international 
. f " l ' l l "I ?S community o states was too 1tt e, too ate -· . 
In its report the ICISS states: "There must never again be mass killing or 
ethnic cleansing. There must be no more Rwandas." 126 But does "the Responsibility 
to Protect" proffer a solution for a case like Rwanda? Does it provide a viable answer 
to the inability of the international community to protect civilians in need? 
The ICISS gives priority to the task of prevention. Against the background 
that an early warning had been received by the UN three months prior to the outbreak 
of the crisis, it would doubtlessly have been possible to take preventive measures. 
Given the immediacy to take action after the early warning, root-cause prevention 
was no longer an option in Rwanda. However, there would have been sufficient time 
to launch a direct prevention campaign. The ICISS identifies a number of potential 
means in its direct prevention toolbox. In the Rwandan case, it would have been 
appropriate to employ proper conflict management strategies to de-escalate the 
situation between Hutu and Tutsi groups. Additionally, the international community 
could have taken direct prevention measures of a military nature, such as consensual 
increasing of the number of UN peacekeeping troops already stationed in the 
country. The sole presence of such troops might have served as a deterrence to carry 
out the planned genocide. Had the ICISS framework been universally accepted in 
1994, and had the international community undertaken the preventive measures 
recommended, the Rwanda tragedy could possibly have been avoided. 
1
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Even if the UN had failed on the stage of prevention, there would have been 
the option to avert or at least to curb the Hutu atrocities by resorting to military 
action. Although the ICISS does not quantify the term 'large-scale', the situation in 
Rwanda certainly would have met the Commission's "just cause"- threshold of 
"large-scale ethnic cleansing". Just as little doubts exist that an intervention force 
would have satisfied the ICISS precautionary principles. Albeit tardily, the Security 
Council also passed a resolution authorizing military action. As the Rwandan State 
was incapable to exercise its responsibility to protect its own citizens from genocide, 
under the ICISS concept it would have been the obligation of the international 
community of states to pick up this responsibility. Thus, in the Rwandan case. "the 
Responsibility to Protect" would have clearly imposed a duty on the outside world to 
intervene. This conclusion demonstrates the benefit of the ICISS framework: it 
allows for an assessment of a crisis situation and provides clear instructions as to 
when military intervention in a sovereign state is not only appropriate but even a 
duty. It is not clear, however. if this approach would have been enough to solve the 
Rwandan dilemma. The real problem in the Rwandan context was not the 
disagreement of the international community over the existence of a right to 
intervene, but rather a Jack of political willingness on the part of states to risk their 
soldiers' lives in a military action and also a lack of willingness to take sides in 
Rwanda's civil war. 127 The UN's leading members, in particular the US, were not 
prepared to make any substantial commitment to stop the atrocities. 128 Even after the 
Security Council decided to act to try and stop the killing, and reversed its decision 
to reduce the UN peacekeeping troops. the key member states were reluctant to 
supply the necessary personnel and materiel resources. 129 
The ICISS does not miss out the problem of lacking political will. In the last 
chapter of its report, the Commission stresses the importance to get the necessary 
political commitment right and acknowledges that the most compelling task "is to 
work to ensure that when the call goes out to the community of states for action. that 
call will be answered" 130 The following recommendations of how to approach this 
127 Adam Roberts ··Intervention: One Step Forward in the Search for the Impossible .. (2003) 7(3) The 
International Journal of Human Ri!!hts 142. 1-i 7. 
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task however, fall somewhat short. The ways suggested by the Commission to 
mobilize political will and to encourage state authorities to act on their 
responsibilities may be promising in theory - but their prospect of success in real life 
is doubtful, given that "international priorities continue to be relegated to national 
self-interest" i:,i. The ICISS. thus, should not have stopped its considerations here, but 
should have asked how human protection can be achieved even without the 
necessary political will of individual states to intervene in certain cases. The UN has 
no military or police forces of its own. It relies on its member states to contribute 
personnel and equipment to support operations. 132 Resolutions therefore can not be 
enforced unless members commit their own troops. This fact has paralyzed the UN in 
many situations. Unfortunately. the ICISS report does not even attempt to find 
solutions for this dilemma. In this respect, the report therefore has to be regarded as 
incomplete. 
The ICISS framework meets its goals by clearly determining that in a 
Rwanda-like situation there is a duty to intervene. However. this cannot be enough, 
given the sometimes lacking political will of states to take action. Under the ICISS 
concept a repetition of the Rwandan catastrophe, thus, cannot be completely ruled 
out. 
B Kosovo -1999 
The history of ethnic conflict in Kosovo dates back over 600 years. rn Serbs 
and Albanians had both long regarded Kosovo as their own historical space and the 
tension between the two groups occasionally erupted into major violence. i:i.i The 
communist government led by Tito, which came to power in 1945, systematically 
repressed nationalist manifestations throughout Yugoslavia, seeking to ensure that no 
Yugoslav republic or nationality gained dominance over the others. rn After Tito's 
death in 1980, a long period of political instability followed and the ethnic rivalries 
13 1 ··An overview of the Responsibility lo Protect - Civil Society Project'· World Federalist 
Movement- Institute for Global Policy <http://www.wmf.org> (last accessed 2 November 2004). 
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began to rise again. 136 In 1989, President Milosevic removed Kosovo's autonomy 
and replaced it with direct rule from Belgrade. 137 "Ethnic Albanian politicians in 
Kosovo responded by declaring independence in July I 990" 138 and by coordinating a 
largely non-violent protest campaign from 1989 until 1997. 139 The conflict between 
Serbs and the ethnic Albanians over Kosovo, however, came to a head when war 
broke out between Serb forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in February 
1998. 140 A few months later, Milosevic commenced a systematic displacement of 
Kosovo-Albanians out of Kosovo. Villages were burned and thousands of Kosovo-
Albanians fled from their homes to escape Serb attacks, creating a threatening 
destabilization in Macedonia and Albania, where most of the refugees resorted. 141 
This presented a potentially catastrophic strategic dilemma for NATO and the 
European Union. It was feared that if civil war broke out in Macedonia between that 
country's Slavs and Albanians, the security interests of all neighbor states would be 
jeopardized. 142 "Both organizations, plus the US and the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe decided that something had to be done··143 and expressed 
their will to take military action. 
The international community tried to resolve the conflict peacefully on the 
diplomatic level. 144 Between March and October 1998 the UNSC passed three 
resolutions 145, which condemned the events in Kosovo and requested the Serbian 
leadership to cease the violent acts, to allow for the refugees to return home and to 
reinstall Kosovo's autonomy. Neither of the resolutions authorized the use of force 
to stop the atrocities. Russia and China both made unmistakable clear that they 
would veto any SC resolution to support military intervention. 
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"The issue simmered for some months, until the massacre of 45 civilians in 
Racak in January 1999 led to a NATO warning that it remained willing to intervene 
militarily." 146 On 24 March 1999, after negotiations in Rambouillet 147 between the 
NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to peacefully resolve the 
matter had failed , the NA TO commenced air strikes against FRY. The intervention 
was based on the premise "that the atrocities performed were on such a broad scale 
and done with such cruelty against innocent civilians, that intervention was 
necessary" 148 even without Security Council sanction. After a 78-day bombing 
campaign. Serbian military forces withdrew from Kosovo and NATO peacekeepers 
were deployed. 
The ATO-intervention in Kosovo was and continues to be more 
controversial than any other previous intervention. Were the human rights violations 
in Kosovo serious enough to justify the use of force? Was there a reasonable 
prospect of success or did the intervention make things even worse? Is a high-level 
bombing campaign without ground troops an adequate means to stop human 
atrocities? Can a military action, albeit for human protection purposes , ever be 
legitimate without UN Security Council authorization? What happens if the UN 
Security Council fails to sanction military intervention because one or more of the 
permanent members exercise their veto right? Does that mean that the rest of the 
world has to stand by and watch in face of genocide, rape or displacement? 
The following analysis seeks to determine if the ICISS concept provides 
adequate answers to these issues raised by the Kosovo crisis. 
Was there a 'just cause' for the Kosovo intervention? 
The reason for the intervention in Kosovo was unquestionably the 
suppression and expulsion of the ethnic Albanian population by the Serbs. If the 
circumstances in Kosovo at the time of the commencement of the military action 
constituted a 'just cause' for intervention, however, was subject to great controversy. 
146 Supplementary volume, 112. 
147 The negotiations in Rambouillet concluded with the FRY's refusing to sign the agreement that 
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The ICISS poses the question in its introductory chapter: "Were the human rights 
abuses committed or threatened by the Belgrade authorities sufficiently serious to 
warrant outside involvement?" 1-l9 
Undoubtedly, ethnic displacement took place pnor to NATO's bombing 
campaign. The U refugee agency UNHCR estimated that there were 410.000 
Kosovo-Albanians internally displaced as a result of Serb operations, and another 
90.000 across the border. 150 It is further estimated that between 2.000 and 3.000 
individuals, most of them ethnic Albanians, had been killed in Kosovo before 
NA TO' s launching of war. Whoever expects that the ICISS principles provide a 
definite answer whether this was "sufficient" justification for military action. 
however. will be disappointed. The ICISS establishes the "large scale loss of life" 
and "large scale ethnic cleansing" thresholds to determine whether there is a 'just 
cause' for intervention. But it leaves open whether "ethnic cleansing" includes 
displacement of certain ethnic groups as it occurred in Kosovo. It further does not 
attempt to quantify the term "large scale loss of life". In determining whether the 
death of 2.000 to 3.000 people is enough, one therefore is left on its own. For the 
difficult question whether the happenings in Kosovo have justified a military 
intervention, the ICISS framework. thus. unfortunately lacks clarity. 
The reason for the ICISS not to further specify "large scale"" explains the 
Commission by asserting that in most cases there is unlikely to be major 
disagreement in interpretation of the term. This assumption. however, misconceives 
reality. Consensus may exist in a clear-cut situation like the Rwandan genocide, but 
not in borderline cases. The controversy and the different positions that have been 
taken to Kosovo, e.g. the western states took the view that the situation demanded 
action. whereas China. India, and Rus ia strictly objected to intervention. upport 
this. In defining only rough indications of when military action is necessary and 
justified, the Commission also grants the states' too much discretion and thereby 
leaves the door open for applying double standards as it occurred in the past. 
Chechnya, for example, has not crossed the intervention threshold for anyone 
1-19 Report. para 1.2. 
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although the level of human rights violations was much higher than it was rn 
Kosovo. 151 
With regard to the ICISS efforts to establish a clear threshold for military 
intervention it therefore has to be concluded that the Commission oversimplified the 
matter. It would certainly have been a toll order to require the Commission to address 
every single possible case in its report. But to combat the issue of selectivity that has 
dogged humanitarian interventions in the past more detailed guidelines would have 
been desirable. 
2 Was there a reasonable prospect of success? 
One of the requirements the ICISS poses is that every intervention has to have 
reasonable prospect of success. The difficulties connected with this criterion can well 
be shown by means of the Kosovo-example. Critics argue that the NATO bombings 
intended to stop human suffering have actually worsened the situation for the civilian 
population in Kosovo. Indeed. most of the displacement and killing of Kosovo-
Albanians took place after NATO action had started. But how can decision-makers 
know what would have happened without NATO intervention? 152 Maybe even more 
displacement and killing would have taken place. In addition to that. critics claiming 
that things were made worse only take the short-term effects into consideration. Of 
course one could put forward that "in the short-run the negative humanitarian 
consequences of the Kosovo action exceeded the positive ones". 153 But from a long-
term perspective, the benefits achieved through the NATO intervention might just as 
well exceed the agony caused in the first instance. How does one balance short-term 
effects against long-term ones? 15..i For these questions the ICISS cannot provide an 
answer. Thus, the ' reasonable prospect of success' -criterion confronts decision 
makers with considerable problems that question its practicability. 
151 Welsh. Thielking and MacFarlane, above n 85. 496. 
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3 Was the modality of NATO's intervention proportionate? 
Not only the question "if' the threshold for intervention was met in the 
Kosovo crisis but also "how" NATO's military action was carried out was highly 
disputed. NATO's intervention consisted of a 78 days high- level bombing campaign 
with wide ranging, also civilian-used, targets. Ground troops which possibly would 
have been even more effective to top the atrocities and at the same time presumably 
would have entailed less victims and less destruction were not deployed. Therefore 
many argued that the manner in which NATO's intervention was conducted was 
inconsistent with humanitarian aims. 155 
The ICISS stresses in its report that military intervention must be carried out 
with proportional means. This requires that the nature of the force used must be 
proportionate to the humanitarian objective and limited in scale and intensity. 156 It 
can be assumed that NATO's military action would have been more effective and 
would have achieved better results for both Serb and Albanian civilians if ground 
troops would have been deployed. 157 This suggests that NATO's intervention does 
not satisfy the ICISS' "proportionate means"-criterion. However, it would have been 
desirable if the Commission had paid more attention to the role of military 
technology in ascertaining the reasonable means principle. 158 
4 The 'right authority' dilemma 
The most controversial issue in the debate surrounding the Kosovo 
intervention is the issue of "right authority". Article 53 of the UN Charter states that 
"no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council". making the latter the 
first port of call to authorize intervention. 159 "The difficult question - starkly raised 
by Kosovo - is whether it should be the last." 160 On the one hand, the decision of the 
NATO members to intervene single-handedly was strongly condemned. On the other 
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hand, many claimed that as Russia and China, two of the permanent five members of 
the Security Council, had made unmistakable clear that they would veto any 
resolution initiating military action in Kosovo, NATO had no other choice but to 
intervene without UN mandate, if it didn't want to sit back idly in face of the Serbian 
atrocities. 
How does the ICISS deal with this dilemma? 
The Commission reaffirms that the UN Security Council is the most 
appropriate body to authorize intervention for human protection purposes. In doing 
so ··the Commissioners are well aware of the objections to such a recommendation: 
the slowness of Security Council decision-making. the under-representation of key 
regions, and the political nature of vetoes of the five permanent members" 16 1. To 
combat the latter problem, the ICISS suggests that the "Permanent Five" should 
agree on a "code of conduct". whereby, in a humanitarian crisis, they would not use 
their veto right in matters where their vital national interests are not involved. 
This proposal might be useful in theory, but is very unlikely to be realized in 
practice. 162 It fails to take into account how strongly the "Permanent Five" cling to 
their veto-rights which give them the power to decide about what should and what 
should not be done on the international security stage. The veto was an essential 
component of the original 1945 deal with Russia, France, China, the USA and the 
UK leading to the passing of the UN Charter. 163 Since then, the "Permanent Five" 
have resisted any reform, and hoping that they will be open for a change in the future 
seems to be an illusion. Even if the permanent SC members would agree on an 
ordinance recommended by the ICISS , there remain two clear difficulties. "First, if a 
permanent member is engaged in an act that might occasion intervention, this would 
not preclude that member" s use of the veto." 16~ One is tempted to think of Russia's 
engagement in Chechnya. 16" Secondly. the permanent five members might disagree 
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on what constitutes a "vital national interest". 166 China, for example vetoed the 
"extending peacekeeping operations in Guatemala and Macedonia because it 
objected to the decisions of both countries to establish diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan" 167. Even in the unlikely case that the "Permanent Five" agree on the 
proposed "code of conduct", situations in which the Security Council is paralyzed, 
thus, can not be ruled out. 
The question remarns: What happens if the Security Council is unable or 
unwilling to act as in the Kosovo crisis? The Commission acknowledges that there 
must be alternative sources of authorization if the SC fails to act although human 
rights issues are significantly at stake. As such alternatives, the ICISS suggests UN 
General Assembly support or authorization by regional organizations under chapter 
VIII UN Charter. 
Had the Commission's first proposal been common! y accepted in 1999, there 
would have been a great chance to find a General Assembly majority for NATO's 
intervention in Kosovo. However, one should remember that the assembly's 
decisions are not binding and only have the status of "recommendations". 168 
The reasons given by the Commission to explain its second alternative to SC 
authorization are convincing. Indeed. many humanitarian disasters have significant 
impact on neighbouring countries and it is plausible that "countries within the region 
are more sensitive to the issues and context behind the conflict headlines" 169 . The 
proposal that regional organizations could take military action , despite the Security 
Council failure to give authorization therefore appears to be a wise idea. One thing, 
however, has to be taken into consideration. A regional organization capable and 
willing to intervene does exist in Europe and orth America with the NATO. But 
Asia does not have a comparable institution at all and Africa's African Union (AU; 
formerly OAU) might not only be too weak but also reluctant to act. Nevertheless the 
ICISS' proposal to include regional organizations is a step into the right direction. 
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The Commission states that an intervention carried out by a regional 
organization without prior SC sanction is "subject to their seeking subsequent 
authorization from the Security Council" 170. As to what the legal position is, if such a 
subsequent authorization is not given, in particular whether or not sanction by a 
regional organization can serve as a substitute for Security Council mandate, the 
Commission does not give an answer. This produces a sense of disappointment. 
The ICISS explicitly mentions NATO as a regional organization. 171 But it 
makes clear that an intervention carried out by a regional organization without prior 
Security Council authorization can only be legal if it takes place within the defining 
boundaries of the organizations. Although not expressly mentioned, it thereby 
intimates that it in its view NATO's "out-of-area" intervention in Kosovo was illegal. 
All in all, one has to conclude that the Commission provides useful 
approaches to some questions surrounding the Kosovo intervention, though it does 
not provide a panacea for all facets of the dilemma. 
C Iraq-2003 
After the devastating terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New 
York and the Pentagon in Washington in September 2001, US President Bush spoke 
about a "war against civilization" and appealed for a campaign to repay the attacks. 
The Bush-created term "axis of the evil" also included Iraq. After almost a year of 
rhetorical and logistic preparation of the war against Iraq and months of trying to 
gain international support for a military action, the United States finally commenced 
its combat operation in March 2003. Three weeks of intense fighting followed until 
Iraq's Ba'athist government was toppled and a U.S.-led occupation of Iraq began. 
The US government justified the invasion of Iraq on a variety of grounds, the major 
being purported Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and an alleged link of 
Iraq to the terror group Al Qaeda. However, as no evidence was found for WMD's 
and no connection between Iraq and international terrorism had been discovered, the 
170 Report. synopsis XIII. 
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pre-war justifications gave way to the rationale of human protection. 172 The Bush 
administration's dominant remaining justification for the war now is that the Iraqi 
population had to be freed from the oppressive dictator and tyrant Saddam Hu sem -
f h . . . . in an argument o umamtanan rntervent1on. · 
As humanitarian concerns were clearly not America's pnmary motive for 
intervening in Iraq, the retrospective humanitarian justification fuels many people's 
worst fear. The fear that the vague nature of humanitarian intervention gives 
powerful states a justification to intervene in the affairs of weaker states, hiding its 
selfish political purposes behind arguments of humanitarian necessity. The ICISS 
seeks to overcome this dilemma and to reduce the danger of abuse by laying down 
clear principles as to under which circumstances an intervention can claim itself to be 
humanitarian and to be legitimate. If the Commission meets this self-imposed goal 
can be examined by applying the ICISS guidelines to the US-Jed invasion in Iraq. 
The ICISS criterion of "just cause" requires " large scale loss of life" or "large 
scale ethnic cleansing". There were times in the past where this criterion might have 
been met. During the 1988 Anfal genocide, for example. the Iraqi government 
slaughtered some 100,000 Kurds. 174 But at the time of the US invasion in 2003, "no 
one contends that the Iraqi government was engaged in killing of anywhere this 
magnitude" 175 . As brutal as Saddam Hussein's reign had been. the scope of Iraqi 
government's killing in March 2003 did not satisfy the ICISS' threshold. 176 This is 
itself sufficient to conclude that the US war was not a legitimate humanitarian 
intervention according to the ICISS concept. As the initial justifications for the 
military action were not humanitarian , the US invasion further did not meet the 
ICISS "right intention'' criteria. The question whether the military action satisfied the 
"last resort", the ·'proportional means" and the "reasonable pro pects·· requirements 
does not even arise as there was no humanitarian crisis in Iraq in 2003. Moreover, the 
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intervention came without UNSC authorization and thus did not meet the ICISS 
"right authority" standard. The war in Iraq therefore clearly fails to fulfil the ICISS 
criteria for justified military intervention for human protection purposes. 
This result proves that the ICISS concept could in the future serve as an 
effective safeguard against '·non-humanitarian intervention dressed in humanitarian 
garb" 177 and could. on the basis of its set of criteria for the justified use of force 
successfully eliminate the danger of the abuse of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention. 
V ANALYSIS 
The foregoing application of the ICISS principles to the cases of Rwanda, 
Kosovo and Iraq has already revealed some of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
ICISS concept. One advantage of the framework is its clear set of criteria which 
curbs the danger of the abuse of the humanitarian intervention-idea. Positive are also 
the Commission's thoughtful remarks on the different preventive tools. However, the 
ICISS fails to provide convincing proposals how to generate sufficient political will 
to respond consistently to those cases that meet the ICISS criteria for intervention. 
The report also lacks precision as to the question when exactly the ICISS threshold 
for military intervention is satisfied. With regard to the 'right authority' dilemma the 
Commission's proposals leave a mixed mark. Its suggestion for a 'code of conduct ' 
for the use of the veto rights is useful in theory but unlikely to be realized in practice. 
The Commission's exploration of alternative procedures if the Security Council fails 
to act, however, is well thought. The following analysis of the ICISS framework 
seeks to complement this list of strengths and shortcomings, focusing first on the 
Commission's underlying 'responsibility to protect' - idea before moving on to a 
detailed examination of its several elements. 
A The "Responsibility to Protect" - Idea 
The ICISS puts forward a new idea for reconciling the conflicting principles 
of state sovereignty and intervention. Rather than revitalizing the question of a ' 'right 
177 Weiss, above n 163, 148. 
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to intervene" it refers to the "responsibility to protect". Is this really a substantive 
step forward? 178 Or is it no more than a clever twist of vocabulary? 179 The truth, as 
often, lies somewhere in between. Changing the language does, of course, not change 
the underlying issues of the debate: "it still amounts to the use of military coercion to 
protect human rights without the consent of the sovereign authority" 180. "There still 
remain to be argued all the moral, legal , political and operational questions - about 
d h . ·11 d . " 18 1 s h k "d [ h nee , aut onty. w1 an capacity. o w y, as s ewman oes t e 
responsibility to protect] constitute a ·new approach' as the report claims"? The 
an wer is simple. It changes perspectives and thereby offers an alternative Jens 
through which to view the issues that have so Jong surrounded the humanitarian 
intervention debate. 
The notion of a "right to intervene" is tainted with the negative experiences of 
the past. "It conjures up in many non-Western minds historical memories of the 
strong imposing their will on the weak [ ... ]'" 18~ using their right to intervene as an 
instrument of inconsistent, cruelly selective intervention policies. hijacked by their 
national interests. 183 The ' responsibility to protect' - idea allows for leaving these 
negative connotations behind and for opening up a new basis of discussion. Not the 
rights and prerogatives of the potentially intervening states are at the focus of the 
attention , but the urgent needs of those in misery. 184 This approach helps to 
overcome the deadlocked positions of the past and to bridge the divide between the 
different sides. By accepting the possibility of intervention in a sovereign state in a 
situation where the state itself failed to fulfil its responsibility to protect, the ICISS 
does not intend to weaken the non-intervention principle. Quite the contrary: the 
Commission explicitly restates its value and affirms that military intervention is only 
a last resort option. This attitude shows that the ICISS rightly acknowledges the 
weight the non-intervention principle still has in international law. 
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The ICISS justifies its new understanding of sovereignty as responsibility, 
among other things, with the increasing relevance of the notion of 'human security' 
in international Jaw. Traditionally, the major security threats a state had to cope with 
were assumed to come from the outside. 185 That is why security issues were 
discussed in the context of ' tate security'. The protection of the state, its boundaries, 
people and institutions from external attacks were at the centre of this discussion. 186 
In the last decades. however, the nature of conflict has undergone a change. Inter-
state conflicts have diminished and the sources of danger have largely turned 
internal. 187 The state which was traditionally perceived as the protector of its people 
frequently played ineffective roles in shielding its citizens from danger and often 
even constituted the source of danger itself. 188 It thus became clear that conventional 
state security alone cannot protect people and that the international community has to 
come up with a new paradigm. In recent years, many states and international 
organizations have therefore begun to broaden the traditional concept of security and 
to include perspectives of 'human security". In the 'human security' domain the 
security of individuals is paramount. 189 To achieve this security. new effective means 
and mechanisms need to be found. The ICISS takes up this challenge and argues that 
when the well-being of people is seriously at stake there is a trans-boundary 
obligation for the outside world to interfere. This marks a watershed in the theory 
and practice of 'human security'. By imposing the subsidiary responsibility for 
human security on the international community, the ICISS shows that in its view 
states that violate fundamental human rights are no longer protected by the principle 
of sovereignty. The ICISS-concept elevates "the people's sovereignty, rather than the 
. ' . " I 90 d h b h d f h sovereign s sovereignty an t ere y prepares t e groun or a more uman-
rights-centred interpretation of international relations. This approach needs to be 
regarded as one of the most important contributions to the human security debate of 
the last years. 191 
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The 'responsibility to protect' - concept is ethically convincing and 
successfully debilitates normative scepticism towards interventions for humanitarian 
purposes. Unfortunately, the ICISS fails to provide persuasive arguments to 
substantiate that the purported "emerging guiding principle" of a "responsibility to 
protect" has already become firmly established in international law. This is 
regrettable but does not cloud the overall picture of the "responsibility to protect" -
idea. The ICISS approach i innovative and refreshing. It helps to address the 
humanitarian intervention dilemma from a totally new angle and thus deserves the 
highest acknowledgement. 
Two other major contributions of a general nature need to be mentioned. The 
Commission's proposal to relabel humanitarian intervention as "intervention for 
human protection purposes" seeks to satisfy different humanitarian organizations that 
were strongly opposed towards any militarization of the word "humanitarian". 
Indeed, the terms "humanitarian" and "intervention" do not match. The word 
humanitarian is marked by humanitarian values and a devotion to human welfare, the 
word intervention in contrast stands for the use of military force and the loss of 
human life this entails. An adoption of the Commission's proposal, thus. would be a 
welcome improvement. Whether the new term will succeed in replacing its long-
established predecessor, however, has yet to be seen. 192 
Even more valuable is the ICISS' second contribution: its focus on a 
spectrum of action. According to the Commission, the responsibility to react never 
stands alone. It is part of a comprehensive responsibility to protect and needs to be 
seen in the context of an integral responsibility to prevent and a responsibility to 
rebuild. 19:, This notion of a continuum of action makes the international community 
aware that there are more alternatives than simply invasion or inaction 19,. and makes 
the ICISS concept a useful tool for guiding states' action at every stage of a 
(potential) humanitarian crisis. 
The different elements of the ICISS' "responsibility to protect" are discussed 
below. 
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B The Responsibility to Prevent 
One can only agree with the ICISS attitude towards prevention. It should be 
the top priority of the international community to address conflicts as early as 
possible, to settle them peacefully and thus make military intervention dispensable. 
In placing the emphasis on prevention rather than reaction the ICISS is well aware of 
the biggest dilemma arising in this context. Taking preventive measures requires 
enormous economic engagement by states and international organizations - an 
engagement that many are not willing to take in the absence of a full-scale crisis. 195 
That the ICISS cannot provide a magic bullet for thi s problem is understandable. Its 
compelling plea to the international community to finally change '·from a 'culture of 
reaction· to that of a 'culture of prevention ·"196, however. could have been even more 
effective had it been linked with concrete demands and recommendations for action. 
C The Responsibility to React 
The ICISS identifies six criteria for the justified use of force for human 
protection purposes. The elements of the Commission's list are not entirely new . 
Many have already attempted to establish clear guidelines for humanitarian 
interventions in one form or another. The special strength of the ICISS' approach, 
however, lies in its effort to combine these individual views. This gives the report an 
unprecedented comprehensiveness. In establishing the set of criteria the ICISS relies 
on the "just war"-framework. Taking "just war" thinking as a starting point deserves 
support. The "just war"- theory does have limitations, but it nevertheless constitutes 
the most sophisticated framework for thinking about moral action in the context of 
war. 197 It has roots in the ethics of all the great world religions and has been a vital 
source of international law for centuries. It therefore has to be regarded as an 
appropriate foundation for developing principles that are capable of finding 
consensus around the world. 
The set of criteria devised by the Commission on the basis of the "just war" 
framework, however, is not without its shortcomings. Some of these have already 
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been outlined in the previous chapter. Therefore only two additional aspects will be 
the focus of the discussion here. Firstly. the narrow formulation of the ICISS' 'just 
cause' threshold and secondly the criticism of legal scholars of the criterion of 'right 
intention'. 
l Just cause 
The ICISS sets a very high bar for military intervention. It explicitly states 
that the threshold is not satisfied in cases of systematic racial discrimination, massive 
human rights abuses and the overthrow of democratically elected regimes. It is 
difficult to comprehend that the Commission excludes these situations. Systematic 
racial discrimination and massive human rights abuses are jus cogens norms for most 
international lawyers. 198 Given the experiences of the last decade the preclusion of 
intervention after the toppling of a democratic government appears just as puzzling. 
"The Security Council-approved and US-led effort in Haiti in 1994 had already set 
the precedent of outside pressure [ ... ] to restore an elected government." 199 The 
condemnation of the overthrow of the government in Sierra Leone in 1997. by the 
UN, and the subsequent UN sanctioned ECOW AS 200 intervention affirmed that the 
use of force for the purpose of restoring a legitimate government is an emerging 
norm in international law.20 1 The ICISS is aware that it excludes situations that some 
have argued are a 'just cause' for intervention. It appears all the more 
incomprehensible that the Commission does not give any reasons to justify its 
decision. 
2 Right intention 
The second disputed ICISS' criterion for military intervention is the criterion 
of "right intention". The Commission states that the "primary purpose of the 
intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering"202 . In doing so, the ICISS 
presents itself refreshingly realistic. It acknowledges that "mixed motives, in 
I 98 · Weiss. above n 163. 139. 
199 Weiss. above n I 63 , 139. 
200 ECOW AS stands for .. Economic Community of West African States ... 
20 1 Levitt , above n 158, 166. 
202 Report. para 4.33. 
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international relations [ ... ] are a fact of life"20~ and that "the budgetary cost and risk 
to personnel involved in any military action may in fact make it politically 
imperative for the intervening state to be able to claim some degree of self-interest in 
the intervention"20~. The Commission thereby makes clear that for satisfying its 
"right intention"-standard a purely humanitarian motive is not mandatory. It is 
sufficient if the primary purpose is humanitarian. Despite this liberal approach, many 
scholars reject the ICISS ''right intention" criterion. Wheeler, for example, argues 
that the problem with relying on motive "is that it takes the intervening state as the 
referent object for analysis rather than the victims who are rescued as a consequence 
of the use of force" 205 . A better approach. thus. would be to eliminate the '·right 
intention" requirement and to concentrate solely on the prospects for a humanitarian 
outcome instead. This idea is supported by others. Welsh, Thielking and MacFarlane 
state that '·as long as the motives and means do not undermine [a humanitarian] 
result. then a military intervention may be consistent with the responsibility to 
protect [ ... ]"206 . This viewpoint disregards two important arguments in favour of the 
'·right intention" requirement. Firstly, a primary altruistic motive makes acceptance 
of the intervening states' actions by local civilians and support of the foreign troops 
by local groups much more likely. Secondly, the criterion curbs the danger of the 
abuse of the humanitarian intervention doctrine for solely selfish purposes. The 
Commission therefore is perfectly right in making the right intention criterion an 
inherent part of its concept. 
D The Responsibility to Rebuild 
The Commission is certainly right to call upon intervening states to commit to 
a long-term process of rebuilding. The help of the international community is 
imperative to ensure sustainable reconstruction and rehabilitation of the target 
country. By stating this, one should, however, not underestimate the risks associated 
with the responsibility to rebuild. "There is growing concern that the international 
community, by taking on expanded reconstruction responsibilities, is entering into 
203 Report. para 4.35. 
2w Report. para 4.35. 
205 Nicholas J Wheeler S{/\ ·ing Srrangers: Huma11iraria11 /11rerl'enrio11 in /11rernario11a/ Socie(r (Oxford 
University Press. Oxford/UK. New York/USA, 2001) 38 . 
206 Welsh, Thiel king and MacFarlane. above n 85. 50 I. 
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the next generation of imperialism."207 The continued presence of the intervening 
states in the country not only evokes the feeling of being still invaded among citizens 
but may in pa11icular cases effectively entail undermining that states right to self-
determination. This is irreconcilable with the notion of state sovereignty and may 
weaken a countries identity for years. The challenging task, thus, is to find the right 
balance between leaving too early and staying too long or to say it in the words of 
one of the commissioners: "Taking responsibility without confiscating is the balance 
international administrators have to strike. "208 It is not possible to establish an ever 
fitting time-frame for this. It rather has to be decided on a case-by-case basis when 
the time for leaving has come. The ICISS therefore fulfils its task by clearly spelling 
out the danger of the responsibility to rebuild and thereby making intervening states 
aware of the fact that engagement in a country in the follow-up period to an 
intervention needs to be limited. 
E Operational Principles 
The Commission devotes one chapter of its report to operational principles. 
This section discusses the practical dimension of the spectrum of military operations 
available to states to protect people at risk, from preventive deployments on the 
front-end of the gamut and robust military action to post-conflict reconstruction at 
the back end. 209 
One of the Commission· s principles with regard to the operational dimension 
1s that a "clear and unambiguous mandate is one of the first and most important 
requirements of an operation to protect'' 21 0. As sensible as this suggestion might be, it 
is '·difficult to square with the ICISS earlier discussion of the political obstacles to 
getting any resolution at all within the Security Council in some situations"211 . 
Mandate and authorization go hand in hand and thus it is puzzling that the ICISS 
addresses the authorization dilemma in its "right authority"-chapter. but totally 
ignores it on the operational stage. 
207 Welsh. ahove n 12 . 33 . 
208 Michael Ignatieff ··State Failure and Nation Building .. in J L HolLgrefe and Rohen O Keohane 
(eds) Hu111a11iraria11 /11re1w11rio11 - Erhical. legal, and polirical dilemmas (Cambridge University 
Press. Cambridge/UK. 2003) 299. 321. 
209 Levill. above n 158. I 73. 
210 Report, para 7.15. 
211 Welsh. Thiel king and Macfarlane. above n 85 . 505. 
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Another principle laid down by the Commission is "unity in command". 
There is little doubt that the ICISS is right in stating that "unity of command is 
essential for the successful conduct of operations". However, it is disappointing that 
the Commission does not give any recommendations as to under what command 
interventions should preferable take place. Should United Nations force commanders 
be in charge or should the intervention take place under the command of a certain 
country? The Commission further does not face up to the challenge that "the major 
powers have [in the past] shown little willingness to put their national forces under 
the exclusive command of others":m_ The USA, for example, has more military 
resources than any other country in the world and thus possesses a powerful tool to 
claim the command for itself. Unfortunately, the ICISS fails to address these issues. 
"There is one area where the ICISS , [however] , deserves particular praise: its 
recommendations that intervening nations establish codes of conduct for the 
behaviour of their troops."213 The terrible pictures of the happenings in the Iraqi 
prison Abu Ghurayb have shown the world how atrocious interveners sometimes 
treat the civilian population and have painfully affirmed the need for clear standards 
for the behaviour of soldiers and effective accountability mechanisms when those are 
not met. As one writer puts it: "Nothing would delegitimize the enterprise more 
quickly than situations in which civilians are perceived to need protection from the 
protectors."214 An adoption of the ICISS' proposal to establish codes of conduct and 
to ensure justice and accountability in the exercise of the responsibility to protect. 
thus, would be a very welcome development. 
VI A NEW CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION? 
In Kofi Annan's view, the ICISS has succeeded in its striving for finding a 
new way of reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable notions of interventions and 
· ~ 15 state sovereignty:- · 
How to protect individual lives while maintaining and even strengthening the sovereignty of 
States has become clearer with the publication of this report. You are taking away the last 
212 Welsh. Thiel king and Macfarlane. above n 85, 505. 
213 Welsh , Thielking and Macfarlane. above n 85, 505. 
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excuses of the international community for doing nothing when doing something can save 
lives. J can offer no higher praisc. 11 6 
But how did the rest of the world react to the ICISS-concept? Was it received 
favourable or negative? Is a consensus on "the responsibility to protect" likely or 
rather an utopia? And how do the appalling attacks of 11 September 2001 and the 
subsequent 'war on terror' affect the future of the ICISS ' framework? This part of 
the research paper seeks to explore these questions. 
A The Impact of 'September I I' on "the Responsibility to Protect" 
Three months before the ICISS presented its report to the U Secretary 
General, the dreadful events of 11 September 2001 shattered the world. There can be 
little doubt that these events deflected attention from the Commission's efforts to 
develop a new conceptual framework for humanitarian interventions. 217 Only two 
years earlier, after NATO's intervention in Kosovo, humanitarian interventions were 
the central issue on the public policy agenda - but by late 2001, the 'war on terror' 
was on and immediately occupied the first division of the international debate. 218 If 
there is today a discussion about intervention, it is seldom about protection of human 
rights but mainly about the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the USA. 
in which the Bush administration invoked what is perceived as a right to pre-emptive 
or even preventive intervention on a wide range of mainly security-related 
grounds. 219 The new doctrine and the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
significantly affect the way in which the concept of "The Responsibility to Protect'· 
is perceived and pursued. 22° First of all, they "reinforce the already widespread 
suspicion of states that interventions for humanitarian protection purposes may 
conceal, or lead on to, some broader and more power-political agenda" 221 . The US 
policy of pre-emptive or even preventive self-defence is regarded by many states as a 
serious threat.222 Thus. under the current circumstances these tates are more likely to 
116 Kofi Annan. address lo the International Peace Academy Seminar on ·The Responsibility to 
Protect .. ( 15 February 2002) Government of Canada - Foreign Affairs <http//www.dfa it-
maec i. gc.ca/ic iss-c ii se/report-en.asp> ( las t accessed 13 November 200-t ). 217 Welsh. above n 12 . 33. 
11 8 Roberts. above n 76. 150. 
119 Roberts. above n 76. 150. 
120 Mac Far lane. Thiel king and Weiss. above n I 09 . 983. 
211 Roberts. above n 7 6. 15 I. 
212 Macfarlane. Thiel king and Weiss. above n I 09. 984. 
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plead for a strict non-intervention rule than to adopt a set of criteria to justify 
intervention as proposed by the ICISS.223 Secondly, the USA 's preoccupation with 
the 'war on terror' may limit its willingness and also capacity to engage in situations 
that satisfy the ICISS' threshold for intervention. 224 Without the support of the USA 
as one of the world major powers "The Responsibility to Protect", however, 1s 
unlikely to be formally adopted and to be effectively enforced in practise. 
As always , timing is everything. The publication of the ICISS' report came in 
an inauspicious moment. 
B The International Response to the IC/SS-Concept 
The Commission's objective from the outset has been that its report will have 
a practical and concrete political impact.225 So how did the international community 
of states respond to the ICISS' concept? 
The U Security Council devoted two days 111 May 2002 to the ICISS 
findings. 226 During this meeting the USA showed no enthusiasm about "The 
Responsibility to Protect" and made clear that it "does not and will not accept the 
substance of the report or support any formal declaration or resolution about it"227 . 
This reluctance can not only be attributed to the US preoccupation with the 'war on 
terror' but needs to be perceived as a sign for a general unwillingness to adopt 
standards which might compel to intervene although national self-interests are not 
directly concerned. 228 But not only the USA, but also other Security Council 
members raised concerns about committing to any criteria and were reluctant to give 
up the practise of case-by-case decision making about whether to intervene or not. 229 
The British and French ambassadors even reported that there was widespread 
agreement in the meeting that if new situations emerge - e.g. in Burundi or the 
Congo - the 'Permanent Five' and broader Council would lack the political will to 
22
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deliver troops and would restrict themselves to condemnatory resolutions. 230 To say 
it in the words of one writer: "There is very little appetite in the Council to commit to 
principles that would force its hand_,,:ni The accuracy of this statement is affirmed by 
Russia's reaction to the ICISS' proposed code of conduct for the use of veto rights. It 
strictly resisted any idea of restraint in its veto power. 232 
Canada has pursued the ICISS' proposed adoption of a General Assembly 
resolution which embodies the basic principles of "The Responsibility to Protect" -
an according resolution, however, has yet not been passed. 
The reactions to the ICISS' framework outside the UN network were 
similarly disappointing. In July 2003, at the Progressive Governance Summit, 
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien and British Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke 
up for a quotation of the basic ICISS' principles in the final communique.233 The 
reaction of the other participants was hostile and when Argentina, Chile and 
Germany expressed their strong objections to the suggestion, a supportive passage 
was removed.23--1 
Given the above incidents one cannot but conclude that. as desirable as it 
might be, a formal adoption of the ICISS framework in the near future is unlikely to 
happen. 
VII CONCLUSION 
When the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
took up work in September 2000, it had an ambitious goal - to solve the long-
standing dilemma of humanitarian interventions. It did not completely achieve this 
goal, but the Commission's report nevertheless needs to be regarded as an 
outstanding contribution in the field of international human rights politics. 
230 Welsh. Thiel king and Macfarlane. above n 85. 509. 231 Welsh. Thielking and Macfarlane. above n 85. 509 . 23 2 Welsh. Thielking and Macfarlane. above n 85. 509. 
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The key message of the ICISS report, the imposition of a responsibility to 
protect. is innovative and ground-breaking. It shifts the focus of the humanitarian 
intervention debate from the rights of the interveners to the rights of people at risk 
and the duty of states to protect them_:!35 By doing so, it establishes a new basis for 
discussion that overcomes the familiar and often deadlocked standpoints of the past 
and paves the way for '·redefining the legitimacy and legality of interventions made 
in the name of human rights and humanitarianism"236 . The uniqueness of the ICISS 
report lies in its comprehensiveness, providing not only new guidelines for a 
responsibility to react to humanitarian crisis, but also developing concepts for a 
responsibility to prevent and to rebuild. 
But despite these achievements. the report is not without shortcomings. One 
had wished more clarity at several points where the report stayed rather vague, e.g. in 
defining the ·just cause' threshold for intervention or in measuring the 'reasonable 
prospect of success' criterion. The report's major weaknesses, however, lie in its 
incapability to resolve the issues of political will and right authority. The 
Commission's considerations concerning the difficulty in obtaining appropriate 
authorization of the use of force for human protection purposes sound well in theory, 
but are unlikely to function in practice. The report also fails to provide a solution for 
the problem of generating sufficient political will to take action. In fact, this lack of 
political will might lead to the ICISS concept's own downfall. So far, important 
states like the USA have shown a clear reluctance to adopt the ICISS framework 
which would impose a duty to intervene although national interests might not be 
involved. Without a change in attitude of political decision makers, 'the 
Responsibility to Protect' will fail just as so many other concepts for humanitarian 
interventions before. The "test case" Sudan unmistakably shows that the international 
community has not yet acknowledged its responsibility to protect. Once again. the 
UN struggles with definitions and lengthy debates about whether or not Darfur 
constitutes a threat to 'international peace and security' _:! 37 Meanwhile, the people in 
Sudan continue to suffer. 
m Levitt, above n 158. 175. 
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